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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the present research was twofold. First, we 
aimed to replicate a recent study by Sharot et al. (2010), 
which found evidence for the spreading of alternatives 
(SOA) effect. Second, we investigated the hypothesis that 
cognitive dissonance, which may explain an existing SOA 
effect, is accompanied by significant changes in pupil 
diameter. Our results provide neither support for this 
hypothesis nor do they replicate the SOA effect. We 
conclude that more research is needed to investigate the 
SOA effect and call for deploying more suitable 
experimental paradigms to investigate the link between 
cognitive dissonance states and pupillary changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1956, a new line of research on attitude change emerged 
when a classic experiment found that making choices 
between similarly attractive options can alter subsequent 
preferences toward those options (Brehm, 1956). The free-
choice paradigm was the typical experimental procedure 
used in choice-induced attitude change research. It usually 
starts with participants rating a set of stimuli according to 
how much they like them. Participants then choose between 
stimuli for which they previously indicated identical ratings. 
Lastly, the first rating task for the stimuli is repeated. Past 
research typically showed rating differences between the 
first and the second rating both for chosen and rejected 
items. Specifically, people increase their preference toward 
chosen options and decrease their preference toward 
rejected options, called spreading of alternatives (SOA).  
However, more recent articles (e.g. Chen & Risen, 2010) 
pointed out a shortcoming of the free-choice paradigm. The 
problem is that rating differences for initially similarly rated 
stimuli may only reveal true preference instead of preference 
change. That is, two stimuli rated identically in the pre-
choice task may actually have different underlying true 
preferences, which the rating task does not capture. 
Consequently, the observed spreading of alternatives could 
occur without actual preference change, challenging 50 
years of attitude change research. 
A recent experiment by Sharot et al. (2010) 
attempted to clarify whether the SOA effect holds up to 
experimental procedures free of the shortcoming associated 
with the free-choice paradigm. Therefore, the authors 
adopted a blind-choice paradigm, which started by flashing 
two stimuli on the left and the right side of the computer 
screen simultaneously. Participants assumed that the stimuli 
were two previously rated holiday destinations although the 
computer presented random strings of symbols that were 
masked after a very brief time. When the stimuli 
disappeared, participants chose their preferred option by 
pressing a button assigned to either the left or right stimulus. 
However, participants did not know that the subsequently 
revealed holiday destinations were generated only following 
their choice. A star appeared above the stimuli that 
participants believed to have chosen themselves. The blind-
choice task was both preceded and followed by a rating task 
of the presented stimuli, in which participants indicated their 
preference toward every stimulus. That is, the authors let the 
participants estimate how happy they would be to vacate at 
several holiday destinations. The purpose of the blind choice-
task was to test whether deceiving participants into believing 
that they made a choice between previously identically rated 
options would cause SOA. The result of this study showed 
that choices indeed influence subsequent preferences. More 
specifically, the authors found that selected stimuli increased 
significantly in their subsequent ratings (t (20) = 2.4, p < .03), 
whereas no significant decrease in ratings appeared for 
rejected stimuli (p > .9). Sharot et al. (2010) explained the 
observed SOA in light of both self-perception theory (Bem, 
1967) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; cited 
in Sharot, Velasquez, & Dolan, 2010). Bem’s self-perception 
theory suggests that people only learn about their preferences 
in the process of acting them out. That is, people may observe 
their choices first and shape their preferences accordingly. In 
contrast, Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance proposes 
that people facing decisions between options with identical 
preferences experience psychological tension, which 
motivates them to change their attitudes. Thus, people may 
reduce dissonance by lowering their preference toward the 
rejected option and increasing their preference toward the 
chosen option.  
Psychological tension due to such inconsistencies 
seems to be accompanied by physiological arousal. For 
example, early studies found that participants who wrote 
counter-attitudinal essays under the condition of having much 
freedom to choose their topic showed heightened galvanic 
skin responses and increased attitude change (Croyle & 
Cooper, 1983). The experience of dissonance has been 
described as an unpleasant motivational state characterized by 
heightened electrodermal activity (Harmon-Jones, 2000), 
vasoconstriction and increased heart rate (Martinie, Milland, 
& Olive, 2013). It is well documented that a further indicator 
of sympathetic and emotional arousal are the pupils (e.g. 
Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008). Specifically, pupil 
dilation indicates heightened emotional arousal as compared 
to pupil constriction. Therefore, the question arises whether 
the pupils can serve as an index for experiencing cognitive 
dissonance as well. The results of the sparse research on this 
topic support the notion of pupil dilation as an indirect marker 
of, among others, cognitive conflict (Hochmann, Glöckner, 
Fiedler, & Ayal, 2016). However, it remains unclear whether 
this link also applies to behavior that is incompatible with 
personal preferences, which approximates our notion of 
cognitive dissonance.  
 
 
The present study investigated this link by 
measuring the pupils during the induction and reduction of 
cognitive dissonance through forcing participants to make 
decisions that conflict with their attitudes and providing 
them the opportunity to subsequently change their 
preferences. We took Sharot et al’s (2010) study as a 
template for this end because their adopted blind-choice 
paradigm is both free of the shortcomings of the free-choice 
paradigm and is combinable with pupillometry. Therefore, 
the present study served two purposes. First, it aimed to 
replicate the SOA for selected stimuli as observed in the 
original study. Second, it investigated whether pupillary 
changes serve as an index of cognitive dissonance as 
induced during the blind-choice task and possibly reduced 
in the second rating-task.  
 
METHODS 
 
Material and availability 
The present study has been registered on the Open Science 
Framework prior to data collection and analysis. The 
preregistration manuscript, stimuli, collected data, and 
analysis scripts are available from https://osf.io/rtksh/. 
 
Participants, software, and apparatus 
25 undergraduate psychology students from the University 
of Groningen took part in this study. They were 
compensated in form of SONA credits, which are credits 
that first-year students ought to collect by participating in 
research studies. The study was conducted following the 
approval by the Ethical Committee Psychology of the 
University of Groningen. All participants provided informed 
consent prior to the experiment. Pupil size was recorded 
binocularly with an Eyelink 1000, a video-based eye-tracker 
with a gaze-sampling frequency of 1000 Hz. The testing 
took place in a relatively lit room. The experiment was 
implemented with the experiment builder OpenSesame. 
 
Stimuli and procedure 
The experimental procedure followed the original study of 
Sharot et al. (2010) as closely as possible. However, the 
experiment started with a 5-point eye-tracker calibration 
because we tracked participants’ pupils throughout the 
entire experiment. The study started with a pre-choice rating 
task, of which one trial was 11 s long. In each trial, 
participants were presented with a holiday destination 
formulated as a word for 6 s, after which they had 2 s to 
indicate how happy they were to spend their holidays at that 
destination. The responses were entered on the keyboard, 
using the following scale: 1 = unhappy, 2 = a bit unhappy, 3 
=neutral, 4 = happy, 5 = very happy, 6 = extremely happy. 
A fixation cross was presented for 3 s between the total of 
80 trials.  
An OpenSesame program determined the pairs for 
the blind-choice task. We replicated this task to include 75% 
critical trials, in which participants made a blind choice 
between two identically rated options, and 25% noncritical 
trials, which included choices between items that were rated 
differently in the pre-choice task. In the noncritical trials, we 
determined the revealed blind choice to always be the 
holiday destination that the participant rated more 
favourably in the previous rating task. Each stimulus 
appeared in only one pair. 
 Participants received several instructions at the 
start of the study. As in Sharot et al. (2010), we first let 
participants read the abstract of a research article on 
subliminal decision making (Pessiglione et al., 2008).  
 
The purpose of this was to make participants believe that the 
present experiment was a follow-up study and to convince 
them that they can make decisions in line with their attitudes 
even without conscious processing of their options. After 
participants read the article abstract, they were instructed that 
two masked names of holiday destinations that they rated in 
the first task would be presented side by side for 2 s on each 
trial. We further informed participants that they will not be 
able to consciously perceive them because they would appear 
very briefly and be masked. Participants were not aware that 
random strings of letters were presented instead of actual 
holiday destination words. Participants had 2 s to choose 
between the two masked holiday destinations by pressing the 
left or right arrow keyboard buttons, respectively. Following 
their choice, a pair of holiday destinations was presented that 
either had similar ratings (critical trials) or different ratings 
(uncritical trials) in the pre-choice task. The destination that 
the participant chose blindly was indicated by a star above the 
name. A fixation cross of 3 s appeared before the next blind-
choice trial. The experiment typically lasted one hour.  
The present study diverted from the original one in 
several ways because of lacking details in the original 
research report. First, the replication used a black square that 
was big enough to cover the letters presented in the blind-
choice paradigm as it remained unclear what kind of mask the 
authors used originally. Second, participants pressed ‘z’ and 
‘m’ keys in the blind-choice task to indicate their preference 
for the left or right stimulus, respectively. The original report 
did not specify which keys participants used in the original 
experiment. Further, stimuli in the blind-choice paradigm 
were flashed for 16 ms, as the originally reported presentation 
time of 2 ms is not possible on regular computer screens. In 
addition, our replication employed random sequences of 
normal letters instead of the originally used symbol strings 
because the latter may prime aggression-related arousal and 
therefore impact pupil size measures. We also left out the 
control condition of the original study to include more critical 
and uncritical trials in the experimental condition. Lastly, we 
used the Internet website Travelspin (https://travelsp.in/) to 
generate a random set of 80 holiday destinations as our 
experimental stimuli, which therefore differed from the 
originally used destinations.  
 
Figure 1: Blind-choice paradigm. The figure shows an 
example trial during which the participant makes a blind 
choice between two subsequently revealed holiday 
destinations.  
’’Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of 
this work for personal or classroom use is granted under 
the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-Share 
Alike (CC BY-SA) license and that copies bear this notice 
and the full citation on the first page’’  
 
SRC 2018, November 9, 2018, The Netherlands. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Exclusion criteria  
We excluded participants from the data analysis if one or 
more of the following cases occurred: the participant 
frequently looked away from the fixation dot in the blind-
choice task, the participant blinked excessively, technical 
issues prevented high-quality recording, or the participant 
decided to cancel the experiment or not to show up. We also 
excluded blind-choice trials in which participants did not 
respond within 2s, after which a frowning face indicated a 
timeout. After the data collection, we decided to exclude 
participants who did not give responses in more than 50 
percent of blind-choice trials. Further, we decided to exclude 
participants who pressed one of the keys (‘m’ or ‘z’) to 
choose a destination in more than 90 percent of the blind-
choice trials. We excluded seven participants according to 
these criteria, leaving 18 participants in the final analysis. 
 
Behavioural results 
We employed a random-effects analysis to examine the 
differences in choice ratings between the two rating tasks for 
every trial. We considered the new preference rating for a 
holiday destination the dependent variable whereas the 
original rating and blind choice as the independent variables. 
To test for the SOA effect, we used the following model in 
the R-package lme4style: 
 
new_preference ~ old_preference * selected + 
(1+old_preference * selected | subject_nr) 
 
We predicted to replicate the SOA effect resulting from 
choosing and rejecting stimuli in critical trials. That is, we 
expected increased ratings for chosen items and decreased 
ratings for rejected items in the second rating task as 
compared to the first rating task. Moreover, we expected a 
high test-retest reliability for items as rated in both tasks. 
The LME analysis included the pre-choice ratings and blind 
choices as fixed effects, participant number as a random 
effect, and post-choice ratings as the dependent variable. We 
found a t-value of 14.512 for the fixed effect of the pre-
choice rating, which implies that the first ratings were strong 
predictors of the second ratings. The fixed effect of whether 
a destination was chosen or rejected had a t-value of -0.420. 
Although we did not specify a significance criterion for the 
behavioural analysis in advance, we deemed this result as 
evidence against the hypothesis that blind choices affected 
post-choice ratings. Our results are contrary to previous 
reports showing evidence for the SOA effect. 
Pupil size analysis 
Next, we investigated whether the pupils dilate most 
strongly in critical blind-choice trials because we expect 
revealed blind choices with more similar ratings to evoke 
more dissonance as compared to less similar ratings. We 
conducted the following linear mixed effects (LME) model 
for each pupil-size sample (n):  
 
pupil[n] ~ rating_diff + (1+rating_diff | 
subject_nr) 
 
Here, rating_diff was the difference between the initial 
preferences for two simultaneously presented items in a 
blind-choice trial. We considered an effect reliable when t > 
2 for at least 200 consecutive samples. We predicted that 
there is an effect of rating_diff, such that the pupil is largest 
when rating_diff is small. The analysis focused on the time 
 
 
interval of 1500 during which participants’ blind choices were 
revealed on the computer screen. We averaged the pupil sizes 
measurements into 15 bins of 100 ms each.  
Our results showed that none of the 15 bins reached the 
significance threshold of t > 2. The largest significance value 
(t = 0,868) corresponded to the recordings of 200-300 ms 
before the end of each trial. We did not find evidence for an 
association between pupil size and rating differences of 
stimuli in the blind-choice trials. 
 
 
Correlation-trace analysis  
This analysis focused on our hypothesis that pupil size during 
critical blind-choice trials correlates with spreading of 
alternatives (SOA) strength for selected and rejected stimuli. 
We predicted that the larger the pupil dilation, the greater the 
dissonance and therefore more attitude change in the second 
rating task is necessary to reduce it. We estimated the SOA 
for individual trials and pupil size samples by using the 
following two linear mixed effects (LME) models: 
preference_change_selected ~ pupil[n]+ (1 | 
subject_nr)  
preference_change_rejected ~ pupil[n]+ (1 | 
subject_nr) 
 
Here, preference_change was the difference in pre- and post-
preference for a given item. As above, we considered an effect 
reliable when t > 2 for at least 200 consecutive samples. 
For the pupil size analysis, we used 15 bins of 100 ms each in 
this analysis. The LME analyses revealed that only the pupil 
recordings between 200 – 300 ms reached the significance 
threshold (t = 2.767) to predict SOA for selected items. 
Similarly, only one significant model (t = -2.231) predicted 
SOA for rejected items, which consisted of the recordings 
between 700 – 800 ms of the last 1500 ms in critical blind-
choice trials. However, most slopes of the 15 bins pointed into 
the expected direction (see figure 3). Although not 
significantly, pupil dilation seemed associated with positive 
SOA for selected items and negative SOA for rejected items.  
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Figure 3: Fixed effects slopes for each pupil size bin. The 
depicted slopes indicate whether pupil size predicted SOA 
both for selected and rejected items in critical trials.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Here we report that we cannot replicate the findings of 50 
years of research on the spreading of alternatives (SOA) 
effect, which holds that actions also influence cognitions 
instead of merely following from them. Moreover, we did 
not find evidence for an association between pupil dilation 
and the induction or reduction of cognitive dissonance. Our 
experiment involved three hypotheses, which consisted of 
replicating the SOA and linking the assumed cognitive 
dissonance to SOA strength and pupil dilation.   
The behavioural analysis aimed to replicate SOA. 
Sharot et al. (2010) observed a significant increase in post-
choice ratings for selected stimuli (t (20) = 2.4, p < .03), 
whereas they found no significant decrease in ratings for 
rejected stimuli (p > .9). The present study does not provide 
evidence for SOA in either direction. However, the 
preferences across the two ratings tasks remained relatively 
stable, which implies that participants were largely 
consistent in their responses. Therefore, our results add to 
the uncertainty surrounding the SOA effect as raised by the 
methodological flaws of the free-choice paradigm.  
Both pupil size analyses did not provide evidence for a 
link between the induction and the reduction of cognitive 
dissonance and pupillary changes. Nonetheless, plotting the 
fixed effects slopes indicated an expected but nonsignificant 
association between pupil dilation and more positive ratings 
for selected stimuli as well as with more negative ratings for 
rejected stimuli in the second rating task. Two scenarios 
could explain why our observations did not fall in line with 
the hypotheses. First, our methods may have failed to detect 
a true association between the heightened state of arousal 
during cognitive dissonance and pupil dilation. The other 
option is that there truly is no association, pointing to a 
theoretical inconsistency arising from of previous research 
showing that heightened arousal is associated with attitude-
behaviour inconsistency as well as with pupil dilation.  
The present study includes several limitations. First, we 
believe that the blind-choice paradigm is not an ideal way to 
evoke cognitive dissonance. This is because numerous 
participants stated after the experiment that their 
commitments toward their blind choice was minimal. 
Similarly, participants typically did not believe in their 
agency of making choices themselves, despite the 
experiment’s cover story suggesting otherwise. Further, a 
temporary revelation of only 1500 ms for selected and 
rejected stimuli in the blind-choice task may not be 
sufficient time to understand the inconsistency between 
one’s blind choices and preferences. An additional point to 
consider is that we excluded all blind-choice trials in which 
participants did not respond within 2 s. from analysis. 
Although we similarly kept this timeout limit for replication 
purposes, it is possible that these trials indicated particularly 
strong dissonance that would require more time to choose. 
Lastly, we point out that the experiment’s theoretical 
framework focusing on cognitive dissonance theory is 
assumptive. Sharot et al. (2010) explained their findings 
both in light of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 
1957; cited in Sharot, Velasquez, & Dolan, 2010) and self-
perception theory (Bem, 1967). Hence, other consistency 
theories may explain the originally observed SOA as well.  
Although a close replication of Sharot et al. (2010), 
our study failed to lead to similar findings and thus marks 
the controversy surrounding this effect since a decade. 
Nonetheless, we cannot yet make a firm conclusion about 
the reality of the SOA effect as it requires more research. 
Future studies should examine the SOAeffect by 
employing more robust methods, including the blind-choice 
paradigm, the rate-rate choose paradigm of implicit choice 
paradigm (Chen & Risen, 2010). Research investigating the 
physiological and pupillary effects of cognitive dissonance 
should incorporate more appropriate and suitable ways to 
evoke dissonance that are independent of the paradigms 
used to investigate SOA. Moreover, both directions of 
research should aim at larger participant numbers to increase 
confidence in the stability and generalizability of results. 
 
ROLE OF THE STUDENT  
Alexander was an undergraduate student working under the 
supervision of Dr Sebastiaan Mathôt when the research in 
this report was performed. The student was involved in all 
steps of the research project. Dr Mathôt helped both with 
programming the experimental task and data analysis.  
 
  REFERENCES 
1. Bem, D. J. (1967). Self-perception: An alternative 
interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. 
Psychological Review, 74(3), 183-200. 
doi:10.1037/h0024835 
2. Bradley, M. M., Miccoli, L., Escrig, M. A., & Lang, P. 
J. (2008). The pupil as a measure of emotional arousal 
and autonomic activation. Psychophysiology, 45(4), 
602-607. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00654.x 
3. Brehm, J. W. (1956). Post-decision changes in the  
desirability of choice alternatives. Journal of  
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 52, 384- 
389.1957-04251-00110.1037/h0041006. 
doi:10.1037/h0041006  
4. Chen, M. K., & Risen, J. L. (2010). How choice affects 
and reflects preferences: Revisiting the free-choice 
paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 99(4), 573-594. doi:10.1037/a0020217 
5. Croyle, R. T., & Cooper, J. (1983). Dissonance arousal: 
Physiological evidence. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 45(4), 782-791.  
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.45.4.782 
6. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance.  
Stanford University Press.  
7. Harmon-Jones, E. (2000). An update on cognitive 
dissonance theory, with a focus on the self. In A. Tesser, 
R. B. Felson, J. M. Suls, A. Tesser (Ed), R. B. Felson 
(Ed) & J. M. Suls (Ed) (Eds.), (pp. 119-144). 
Washington, DC, US: American Psychological 
Association. doi:10.1037/10357-005 
8. Hochman, G., Glöckner, A., Fiedler, S., & Ayal, S. 
(2016). 'I can see it in your eyes': Biased processing and 
increased arousal in dishonest responses. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 29(2-3), 322-335. 
doi:10.1002/bdm.1932 
9. Martinie, M., Milland, L., & Olive, T. (2013). Some 
theoretical considerations on attitude, arousal and affect 
during cognitive dissonance. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 7(9), 680-688. 
doi:10.1111/spc3.12051  
10. Pessiglione, M., Petrovic, P., Daunizeau, J., Palminteri, 
S., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2008). Subliminal 
Instrumental Conditioning Demonstrated in the Human 
Brain. Neuron, 59(4), 561–567. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.07.005 
11. Sharot, T., Velasquez, C. M., & Dolan, R. J. (2010). Do 
decisions shape preference? Evidence from blind 
choice. Psychological Science, 21(9), 1231-1235. 
doi:10.1177/09567976103
 
